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Recent outbreaks of Rift Valley Fever in sheep have led to boycotts of African livestock by Middle Eastern
importers. To normalize trade, attempts have been made to apply new livestock forecasting and monitoring
technologies. In this process, producers have exhibited a resistance in revealing livestock health information,
a resistance that could jeopardize the information system and lead to further boycotts. We investigate
the incentives governing this problem and model the most fundamental contract issues, those concerning
reputation and credibility. Equilibrium contracts require that the buyer compensate the producer for private
information to address the shepherd’s dilemma of concealing livestock information (and facing continued
boycotts) or revealing the information and being blacklisted.1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The livelihoods of many nomadic pastoralists in the Greater Horn of Africa depend on the export of lambs
to the Middle East for use in religious ceremonies. Recent outbreaks of Rift Valley Fever (RVF), a relatively
new livestock disease that can be transmitted to humans through ceremonial contact with infected sheep,
have led to boycotts by importing countries. RVF is rare, at most impacting a small fraction of the exported
sheep. It is, however, highly feared and deadly when communicated to humans. This market collapse has
been very costly to all concerned: consumers must resort to Australian lambs of inferior quality and higher
price, while producers have seen their livelihoods threatened (Consultative Meeting of Experts on Rift Valley
Fever, 2001) .
Some market participants have enlisted international groups to develop an RVF forecasting and monitor-
ing system in order to normalize trade and prevent future boycotts (Dilley, 2003). This system could reduce
the likelihood of contaminated lambs entering the market and thereby eliminate the need for continent-wide
quarantines. Two technological advances may make the forecasting/monitoring system feasible. First, recent
advances in veterinary medicine may lower the cost of testing for RVF. Regardless of how inexpensive the
monitoring procedure becomes, however, the cost of obtaining timely samples from sheep across the entire
Greater Horn of Africa remains prohibitive.
Considerable potential exists for using new technologies in seasonal precipitation forecasts to predict
RVF outbreaks (Indeje et al., 2004). Due to its reliance on the mosquito as a vector, the incidence of RVF
is correlated with precipitation patterns. If successful, this technology could allow a monitoring system to
target its sample collection and greatly reduce costs, perhaps making such as system economically feasible. In
addition, the forecasts might provide information useful to producers in performing risk mitigating strategies,
such as minimizing grazing in high-risk areas and immunizing targeted livestock in high-risk years.1
Cooperative participation of the producers is essential for any RVF management system. In spite of
the potential beneﬁts, however, producers have been reluctant to cooperate in the development of an RVF
forecasting and monitoring system. The presence RVF in a ﬂock is evident to a producer due to highly
visible symptoms such as unusually large numbers of sheep abortions. These signs are unobservable to
importers, however, due to the extreme geographic isolation of the producers. Once the lamb has been
1The RVF immunizations being considered are relatively expensive or cause damaging side eﬀects to livestock. They must
be applied weeks before livestock are exposed to the disease to be eﬀective and immunity beneﬁts may decay quickly over
time(Consultative Meeting of Experts on Rift Valley Fever, 2001).
1brought to market, RVF is costly to detect. For prediction, in order to successfully model the climate-
disease interaction it is necessary to obtain local data concerning RVF episodes directly from the producers.
In addition, if implemented, the forecasting/monitoring system would need the continued cooperation of
livestock producers for symptoms reporting and access to animals for testing. Finally, because there is a
potential for violence in many of the impacted regions, cooperation is especially worthwhile.
At its most basic level, this problem is reminiscent of Akerlof’s (1970) lemons model. The pastoralists
have private information regarding the health of their lambs. The likelihood of a lamb being sick is common
knowledge. If this probability is high enough, the buyer is unwilling to oﬀer a price high enough to induce
owners of healthy lambs to sell and the market collapses.
Signaling by high quality sellers is often used as a means of overcoming the lemons problem. Why then
are sellers so opposed to development of an RVF forecasting system? One reason is that individual producers
fear that if they inform researchers of an RVF outbreak, they will be blacklisted. Those most vulnerable
to the market impacts of RVF may be made more vulnerable by the international forecasting/monitoring
eﬀort.2
In this paper we present the most central elements to the problem, the fundamental issues of reputation
and credibility that must be overcome for the market to function. For clarity and ease of generalization, we
present the problem in the simplest form possible, focusing on the interaction between a single buyer and a
population of sellers with private information.
2 The Model
The model builds upon the literature of optimal contracts with costly information veriﬁcation pioneered by
Townsend (1979). In a typical example, an uninformed principal, such as an investor, initiates a contract
with an agent (entrepreneur) about to undertake a risky project. Only the entrepreneur knows the precise
outcome of the project. The investor can obtain the agents’ information, but only with a costly audit.
The principal’s task is to design a contract that stipulates the transfers to be paid and probability of audit
depending on the agent’s declared income. The optimal contract maximizes the net income of the principal.
We model the interaction between the buyer (principal) and the producers (agents) as a repeated game
2(Pfaﬀ et al., 1999; Osgood, 2005) have found evidence in other contexts that forecasting and monitoring information may
impose hardships on speciﬁc subgroups of a population.
2with asymmetric information. The basic forces driving the contractual features can be demonstrated in
analysis of two players in two periods. In Townsend’s initial model the interaction between the parties was
not repeated, and the underlying motivation for the contract was one of risk sharing. In order to focus on
the market for lambs rather than an insurance, we follow the work of Border and Sobel (1987) and assume
that both the buyer and the pastoralist are risk neutral.3
In our context, the importer is the principal. Acting as a Stackelberg leader, she proposes a menu of
contracts to the agents (pastoralists). Each agent chooses the contract that maximizes his expected income.
We obtain the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium to the game by backwards induction. Knowing how the agents will
respond to any given contract menu, the principal designs the menu that maximizes her expected income.
Each agent has one lamb. The status of the lamb (sick or healthy) determines an agent’s type, θ ∈
Θ ≡ {θs,θ h}, and is known only to the agent. Type is perfectly persistent across time periods. The
reservation income to the agent of keeping, rather than selling, the lamb is a function of its type, r(θ),w h e r e
r(θh) >r(θs).
The value to the principal of obtaining a lamb is a function of type, P (θ),w h e r eP (θh) ≥ r(θh) ≥
r(θs) ≥ P (θs). Thus, ideally, the principal would like only to purchase lambs from healthy types. The
principal’s prior belief regarding the probability that an agent’s lamb is sick is ρ ∈ [0,1]. The principal can
verify the type of any given lamb by conducting an “audit” with cost a.4
In the ﬁrst period, each agent’s set of possible actions consists of selecting a contract. We restrict attention
to contracts that depend only upon an individual agent’s actions. That is to say, an agent’s payoﬀ from
making a declaration does not depend upon other agents’ declarations. Under this restriction, the revelation
principle ensures that there is no loss in generality by restricting attention to truthful direct revelation
mechanisms, whereby each agent’s action is redeﬁned as making a declaration ˜ θ1 ∈ Θ regarding his type
(Townsend, 1988).
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.T h es e to fﬁrst period contracts terms consists of two possibilities
3Mookherjee and Png (1989) and Wang (2005) respectively consider problems of costly state veriﬁcation with risk averse
agents in a single period and dynamic settings.
4For the more general case, the average cost of auditing could depend on the accuracy of a forecast as well as the cost of a
medical test, since a skillful forecast could allow one to target medical sampling.
















,f o r˜ θ1 ∈ Θ.
The agent action space in the second period is also simply declaration of type ˜ θ2 ∈ Θ. The set of contracts
is more complicated, however, since the audit probabilities and transfers are contingent not only upon ˜ θ2,
but also information obtained in the ﬁrst period. Speciﬁcally, by the revelation principle, an agent’s action
in the ﬁrst period reveals his true type, regardless of whether he is audited. The set of four possible second





















We assume that the agents have limited liability. As a result, all transfers are bounded from below by
zero. In addition, participation in the contracts is voluntary ex post. Therefore no agent can receive less
than his reservation income by choosing a contract.
Letting δ>0 be the discount rate, the present value of the principal’s expected welfare from a menu of
truthful contracts is:
W =[ 1− ρ]{P (θh) − [G1 (θh)[¯ t1 (θh)+a]+[ 1− G1 (θh)]t1 (θh)]
+δ [P (θh) − [G2 (θh,θh)[¯ t2 (θh,θ h)+a]+[ 1− G2 (θh,θh)]t2 (θh,θh)]]} (1)
+ ρ{P (θs) − [G1 (θs)[¯ t1 (θs)+a]+[ 1− G1 (θs)]t1 (θs)]
+δ [P (θs) − [G2 (θs,θ s)[¯ t2 (θs,θ s)+a]+[ 1− G2 (θs,θs)]t2 (θs,θs)]]}
In a repeated game such as this, the agent’s reputation is critical. In particular, the way that the
principal uses the information revealed during the ﬁrst period drives the equilibrium outcome. The ability
of the principal to credibly commit to not using information obtained in the ﬁrst period can lead to diﬀerent
equilibria.
If the principal cannot commit to ignoring information obtained in the ﬁrst period, then the set of credible
second period contracts is reduced. If an agent’s type is known, it is not reasonable for the agent to believe
that the principal will incur the cost of an audit in the second period, pay more than the healthy agent’s
reservation income, or oﬀer a contract to a sick agent. Consequently, without the ability to commit we have
at equilibrium G2 (θ,θ)=0 ,f o rθ ∈ Θ, t2 (θh,θh)=r(θh),a n dt2 (θs,θ s)=0 .
Since the set of credible second period contracts is reduced, the principal cannot be made worse oﬀ by
being able to commit to not using information obtained in the ﬁrst period. Thus, the principal may beneﬁt
if she can commit to “forgetting” information from the ﬁrst period. To address the impact of commitment
4and reputation, we ﬁrst determine the optimal contract menu for the principal to oﬀer assuming she is able
to commit to ignoring ﬁrst-period information. We then consider the case where she is unable to make this
commitment.
2.1 Perfect commitment
It is a standard result that when intertemporal commitment is permitted and agent types are perfectly per-
sistent across time, the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of a multi-period game is simply the repeated equilibrium
of the single period game (Baron and Besanko, 1984). For the single-period game, the principal chooses the
contract terms that maximize expected current welfare:
W1 =[ 1− ρ]{P (θh) − [G1 (θh)[¯ t1 (θh)+a]+[ 1− G1 (θh)]t1 (θh)]} (2)
+ ρ{P (θs) − [G1 (θs)[¯ t1 (θs)+a]+[ 1− G1 (θs)]t1 (θs)]}





denote the expected income of an agent of type θ choosing the contract intended for an agent
of type ˜ θ. Since participation is voluntary, if a transfer is below an agent’s reservation income he will not
accept the transfer and keep his sheep (and his reservation income). Consequently, we have
I1 (θ,θ)=G1 (θ)max{¯ t1 (θ),r(θ)} +[ 1− G1 (θ)]max{t1 (θ),r(θ)}, (3)

































for θ,˜ θ ∈ Θ,θ6= ˜ θ.
For the direct revelation mechanism to be truthful, each agent must voluntarily to choose his own contract.
That is to say, the following incentive compatibility (IC) constraint must be satisﬁed for each type: I1 (θ,θ) ≥
5We assume that when indiﬀerent between the contract intended for it by the principal and another contract, the agent






Note from the deﬁnition of principal welfare in Eq. (2), that all transfers are costly. Since reducing the
penalty transfers t(θ) increases principal welfare and weakens IC constraints, at the optimum these transfers
are as low as possible:
t1 (θ)=0for all θ. (5)
In this setting there are two classes of optimal contract menus. In one class, no auditing occurs and each
type receives a payment equal to the healthy type’s reservation income. In the other, healthy declarations are
always audited and sick declarations are never audited. In this case, the principal only purchases from the
healthy type, and each type receives his reservation income. Which of these two menus is optimal depends
on the values of the reservation incomes r(θh) and r(θs), the probability of a sheep being sick ρ,a n dt h e
cost of audit a.
This characterization can be proved in two stages. First, we show that it is never optimal for a sick
declaration to be audited. Next, we show that it is either optimal to audit a healthy declaration with
probability zero or one, depending on the exogenous variables.
Note that for any contract in which G1 (θs) > 0, it is optimal to set the unaudited transfer t1 (θs) equal
to zero. To see why, note that if G1 (θs) > 0 and t1 (θs) > 0,t h e nt1 (θs) can be slightly reduced without
changing the value of I (θs,θs) by slightly increasing ¯ t1 (θs) if necessary. Such a change would not reduce
the principal’s expected welfare but could weaken the IC constraint by reducing I1 (θs,θ h).
Suppose that it were in fact optimal to audit a sick declaration with positive probability. In that case,
using Eq. (5)
I1 (θs,θ h)=r(θh). (6)
Hence, the healthy type’s IC constraint does not bind since, by Eq. (3), I1 (θh,θ h) ≥ r(θh).C o n s e q u e n t l y ,
both ¯ t1 (θh) and t1 (θh) are optimally set to r(θh). Reducing the transfers to that level increases the
principal’s expected welfare and weakens the remaining IC constraint by reducing I (θh,θ s). Incorporating
these results, the sick type’s IC constraint reduces to:
G1 (θs)max{¯ t1 (θs),r(θs)} +[ 1− G1 (θs)]r(θs) ≥ G1 (θh)r(θs)+[ 1− G1 (θh)]r(θh). (7)
6This constraint must be binding at the optimum, else ¯ t1 (θs) could be slightly reduced, improving the
principal’s welfare without violating any other constraint. There are two relevant cases with this constraint.
First, if healthy declarations are always audited, it is optimal to set ¯ t(θs)=0since reductions in this transfer
improve the principal’s welfare without violating IC. If ¯ t(θs)=t1 (θs)=t1 (θs)=0 ,h o w e v e r ,t h e r ei sn o
reason to undertake costly audits of sick declarations, thus contradicting our original supposition. Consider
the second case in which healthy declarations are audited with some probability less than one. In that case
IC requires ¯ t1 (θs) >r(θs). Then, the sick type’s IC constraint reduces to:
G1 (θs)¯ t1 (θs)+[ 1− G1 (θs)]r(θs)=G1 (θh)r(θs)+[ 1− G1 (θh)]r(θh).
The principal’s problem can then be re-expressed fully incorporating all constraints as:
max
G1(θh),G1(θs)
[1 − ρ]{P (θh) − r(θh) − G1 (θh)a} + (8)
ρ{P (θs) − [G1 (θh)r(θs)+[ 1− G1 (θh)]r(θh)+G1 (θs)[r(θs)+a] − r(θs)]}
Since this objective is linearly decreasing in G1 (θs),a to p t i m u mG1 (θs)=0 . This result also contradicts
the original supposition that G1 (θs) > 0. Consequently, it is never optimal to audit sick declarations.
Having established that optimally G1 (θs)=0 , note from Eqs. (3) and (4) that I1 (θs,θ s)=I1 (θh,θs) at
the optimum. Otherwise, t1 (θs) could be reduced, improving the principal’s welfare without violating any
other constraints. This IC constraint can thus be simpliﬁed to:
max{t1 (θs),r(θs)} = G1 (θh)r(θs)+[ 1− G1 (θh)]max{t1 (θh),r(θs)}. (9)
In turn, this result implies that the healthy type’s IC constraint can safely be ignored as long as its voluntary
participation constraint is satisﬁed. In other words, I1 (θh,θh) ≥ r(θh) ⇒ I1 (θh,θ h) ≥ I1 (θs,θ h).T o s e e
this, note that using Eqs. (4) and (9),











Consequently, the principal’s welfare can be improved by reducing both the audited and unaudited healthy
7payments to: ¯ t1 (θh)=t1 (θh)=r(θh). Using this result, constraint (9) becomes
max{t1 (θs),r(θs)} = G1 (θh)r(θs)+[ 1− G1 (θh)]r(θh). (11)
Thus, if G1 (θh)=1 , t1 (θs) is optimally reduced to zero. Otherwise, t1 (θs)=G1 (θh)r(θs)+[1 − G1 (θh)]r(θh).
For G1 (θh)=1 , the principal’s welfare is simply:
[1 − ρ][P (θh) − r(θh) − a]. (12)
In general, G1 (θh) is chosen to maximize:
[1 − ρ]{P (θh) − r(θh) − G1 (θh)a} + (13)
+ ρ{P (θs) − [G1 (θh)r(θs)+[ 1− G1 (θh)]r(θh)]}
Since (13) is linear in G1 (θh), if it is optimal to audit at all it is optimal to audit with probability equal to
unity. Auditing is optimal if (13) is increasing in G1 (θh).T h a ti st os a y ,i f :
ρ[r(θh) − r(θs)] > [1 − ρ]a (14)
Intuitively, the left side of this expression represents the expected marginal beneﬁt of auditing. Without an
audit, sick types would receive an payment equal to the healthy types’ reservation income. With an audit,
sick types would receive their own reservation income. The beneﬁt of the audit is the diﬀerence in payments
to sick types. The right hand side of the expression is simply the expected marginal cost of increasing audits
for healthy types.
If, however,
ρ[r(θh) − r(θs)] < [1 − ρ]a (15)
then the optimal probability of auditing a healthy type approaches zero. For G1 (θh)=0 , Eq. (11) implies
t1 (θh)=t1 (θs). Intuitively, with no auditing the principal has no means of discriminating between sick and
healthy types, so all must receive the same payment in order to reveal the truth. The principal’s expected
8welfare from purchasing a lamb is then:
ρP (θs)+[ 1− ρ]P (θh) − r(θh). (16)
Here we have the similarity with Akerlof (1970). If the proportion of sick sheep in the population is
high enough, the expected value to the principal of purchasing a sheep will be negative. In such a case, the
principal will not purchase any sheep, even though with perfect information he could proﬁtably buy them
from healthy types.
If the interaction between the agents and the principals were characterized by perfect persistence (i.e.,
agents with sick sheep in one period have sick sheep in the next period) and credible commitment, one would
expect two possible contracts, both exhibiting deterministic auditing and truthful revelation of sheep health.6
In the ﬁrst outcome, agents would truthfully indicate the type of their sheep, agents with healthy sheep
would receive a higher payment, and all healthy declarations would be audited. In the second, agents would
truthfully indicate the type of their sheep, all agents would receive the same payment, and no declaration
would be audited.
Actual market conditions do not resemble either of these outcomes. Audits of sheep health are never
undertaken (which is not surprising due to the high cost of audits). All sheep receive the same payment.
Agents do not, however, voluntarily indicate the type of their sheep. As a consequence, sick sheep occasionally
are purchased resulting in human illness, risks of boycotts, and generally suboptimal outcomes for everyone.
Cases occur, such as in the Akerlof (1970) model, where the probability of illness is suﬃciently hight that
the market breaks down altogether.
One reason agents may be reluctant to indicate the type of their sheep is that they are afraid that the
principal will use this information against them in the future. If the purchaser cannot credibly commit to
not use this information then the solutions described above are not necessarily equilibria. The next section
characterizes the optimal mechanism without the possibility of commitment.
6This is in contrast to Townsend (1979), where the assumption risk averse preferences led him to conjecture that random
audit strategies would always dominate deterministic ones.
92.2 No Commitment
I nt h ec a s ee x a m i n e di nt h i ss e c t i o n ,t h ep r i n c i p a li sunable to credibly commit to following a second period
strategy that is against his interest at the time. Unlike the previous case, the agent thus believes that by
revealing his type in the ﬁrst period, the principal will take advantage of this information in the second
period by not purchasing from a sick type and paying a healthy type only his reservation income. Thus,
the second period equilibrium payoﬀs for a truthful direct revelation mechanism are simply t2 (θs,θs)=0
and t2 (θh,θh)=r(θh). Moreover, since the principal knows agent types, there is no reason to audit in
the second period, so G2 (θ,θ)=0for all current and previous declarations of type. Similar to the full
commitment case, since transfers are costly to principal and the penalty only appears on the right-hand-side
of IC constraints, the optimal penalty transfer will be as small as possible, i.e., t1 (θs)=t1 (θh)=0 .
When confronted with a menu of contracts, in the ﬁrst period an agent chooses the one that maximizes
the present value of his expected income, knowing how the principal will react to his declaration in the next




denote the present value of expected income for an agent of type θ
choosing the contract intended for an agent of type ˜ θ. With voluntary ex post participation we have:
I2 (θs,θs)=G1 (θs)max{¯ t1 (θs),r(θs)} +[ 1− G1 (θs)]max{t1 (θs),r(θs)} + δr(θs) (17)
I2 (θh,θs)=G1 (θh)[1+δ]r(θs)+[ 1− G1 (θh)][max{t1 (θh),r(θs)} + δr(θh)] (18)
I2 (θh,θh)=G1 (θh)max{¯ t1 (θh),r(θh)} +[ 1− G1 (θh)]max{t1 (θh),r(θh)} + δr(θh) (19)
I2 (θs,θh)=G1 (θs)r(θh)+[ 1− G1 (θs)]max{t1 (θs),r(θh)} + δr(θh) (20)
For the direct revelation mechanism to be truthful, each agent must voluntarily to choose his own contract.





The no-commitment equilibria diﬀer from the full commitment equilibria in one key aspect. Like the
previous case, full auditing of healthy declarations may be optimal if audit costs are suﬃciently low. Unlike
the previous case, however, the complete absence of auditing is not an equilibrium. Rather, random audits of
healthy declarations can be optimal. In the likely case that random audits are optimal, the payment scheme
diﬀers markedly from the full commitment equilibrium. Namely, the ﬁrst period transfer to unaudited
healthy declarations can be strictly lower than for sick declarations. Audited healthy declarations, however,
receive a bonus payment. It is the expected value of this bonus that gives healthy types an incentive to tell
10the truth.
First, note that similar to the full commitment setting, it is never optimal to audit sick declarations with
strictly positive probability. Since the proof is essentially the same as in the previous section, it will not be
repeated here. Given G1 (θs)=0 , the sick type’s IC constraint must be binding since otherwise t1 (θs) could
be reduced and weaken the healthy type’s IC constraint. The sick type’s IC constraint simpliﬁes to:
I2 (θs,θ s)=I2 (θh,θs) ⇒
max{t1 (θs),r(θs)} + δr(θs)=G1 (θh)[1+δ]r(θs)+[ 1− G1 (θh)][max{t1 (θh),r(θs)} + δr(θh)]. (21)
Since for G1 (θh) < 1 the right-hand side of Eq. (21) is greater than [1 + δ]r(θs), for any healthy audit
probability less than one it must be the case that t1 (θs) >r(θs). Moreover, the principal can reduce t1 (θh)
to r(θh) without adversely aﬀecting her welfare. Such a move reduces the size of t1 (θs) necessary to satisfy
Eq. (21). If accompanied by a corresponding increase in ¯ t1 (θh) it does not increase the expected cost of
satisfying the healthy type’s IC constraint. Thus, for G1 (θh) < 1, Eq. (21) can be simpliﬁed further to:
t1 (θs)=G1 (θh)[1+δ]r(θs)+[ 1− G1 (θh)]r(θh)+δ [r(θh) − r(θs)]. (22)
The healthy type’s IC constraint then simpliﬁes to:
I2 (θh,θ h) ≥ I2 (θs,θh) ⇒
G1 (θh)max{¯ t1 (θh),r(θh)} +[ 1− G1 (θh)]r(θh) ≥ max{t1 (θs),r(θh)}. (23)
Note that this constraint is binding. For any ¯ t1 (θh) >r(θh) for which the left-hand side of (23) is strictly
greater than the right-hand side, the principal can improve her expected welfare by holding all else constant
and reducing ¯ t1 (θh) without aﬀecting other constraints. It is never optimal, however, for the principal
to reduce ¯ t1 (θh) below r(θh). Doing so would not weaken any IC constraints. In addition, it would cause
audited healthy types to refuse to participate. The principal would then forfeit income equal to P (θh)−r(θh)
for those agents. The healthy types’ IC constraint can thus be simpliﬁed to:
G1 (θh)¯ t1 (θh)+[ 1− G1 (θh)]r(θh)=m a x{t1 (θs),r(θh)}. (24)
11By comparing contraints (22) and (24) we see that any contract that entails no auditing cannot be
incentive compatible. For by (22), G1 (θh)=0⇒ t1 (θs) >r(θh). Yet by (24), G1 (θh)=0⇒ t1 (θs) ≤
r(θh).
From (22) and (24) we can also see that if G1 (θh) is changed by a small amount dG1 (θh), then incentive
compatibility is preserved by changing ¯ t1 (θh) in the opposite direction by an amount d¯ t(θh).I f t1 (θs) >
r(θh),t h e n
d¯ t(θh)=
r(θs) − ¯ t(θh)
G1 (θh)
dG1 (θh). (25)





In other words, for the principal there is a tradeoﬀ between the size of the reward for truth-telling and the
probability of audit. For any incentive compatible combination of ¯ t1 (θh) and G1 (θh), another combination
with higher (lower) ¯ t1 (θh) and lower (higher) G1 (θh) will also be incentive compatible.
Using the results obtained thus far in this section, the principal’s welfare function can be simpliﬁed from
Eq. (2) to:
W2 =[ 1− ρ]{[1 + δ]P (θh)
−[G1 (θh)[¯ t1 (θh)+a]+[ 1− G1 (θh)+δ]r(θh)]} (27)
+ ρ{P (θs) − [G1 (θh)r(θs)+[ 1− G1 (θh)]r(θh)+δ [r(θh) − r(θs)]]}
Diﬀerentiation of (27) shows that from any initial combination in which IC constraints are satisﬁed, the gain
to the principal’s welfare from a marginal increase in G1 (θh) and decrease in ¯ t1 (θh) that satisﬁes IC is:
[r(θh) − r(θs)] − [1 − ρ]a (28)
The ﬁrst bracketed term is the beneﬁt of the information obtained from auditing in terms of reduced transfers
to both types of agents. Notice that this beneﬁt is higher than in the full commitment case. The reason is
that incentive compatibility constraints bind for both types without commitment as opposed to only binding
for the low type with full commitment. The second term is the expected cost of a marginal increase in audit
probability. If expression (28) is positive, then it is optimal to increase the probability of audit as high as
12possible, i.e., to unity. If the expression is negative, it is always optimal to reduce G1 (θh). As discussed
earlier, however, the probability of audit cannot be reduced to zero and still satisfy IC constraints.
If there is an upper bound tmax >r(θh) on the credible payment for being “caught” telling the truth,
then G1 (θh) can only be reduced until the upper bound on transfers is reached. In this case, the optimal
value of G1 (θh) is obtained by rearranging Eq. (24) to solve
G1 (θh)=
δ [r(θh) − r(θs)]
tmax − [1 + δ]r(θs)
. (29)
To summarize, there are two classes of equilibra to the no-commitment game. Neither is characterized
by auditing sick declarations. If the cost of auditing is suﬃciently low, the principal always audits healthy
declarations. In this case, each type of agent receives his reservation income. The other class of equilibria
is characterized by a random auditing of healthy declarations. In this case, healthy agents receive their
reservation income if not audited. Audited, healthy agents receive an bonus payment. The higher this
additional payment, the lower is the necessary probability of audit. Sick agents receive payments strictly
greater than their reservation income in the ﬁrst period. In the second period, all types receive their
reservation income.7 If the audit cost is suﬃciently high, and the maximum bonus is suﬃciently low, the
market may still collapse since the principal’s expected proﬁt would be negative.
One reason agents may be unwilling to disclose the type of their sheep is the fear that the principal will
later use this information against them. The analysis in this section shows that if this is the case, it may
be optimal to encourage truth-telling by oﬀering a premium for sick sheep, and a bonus for audited healthy
sheep.
3C o n c l u s i o n
In addressing the problem of the normalization of the livestock trade disrupted by Rift Valley Fever, we have
presented a core model expressing the basic incentive issues resulting from private information, producer
reputation, and buyer credibility. The analysis implies that a cooperative outcome might be achieved if the
principal rewards the agent for revealing private health information. The feasibility of the outcome depends
on the probability of sickness, the cost of monitoring, and the values of healthy and sick sheep for the players.
7These results are similar to those obtained by Border and Sobel (1987) for multiple types in the single period game.
13In the equilibrium contract identiﬁed, the principal gains by setting incentives so that being audited is
like winning a lottery—if the agent is truthful. The agent wins by being “lucky enough” to be found to be
telling the truth. This contract eliminates situations in which it is worthwhile for the agent to declare that
a sick sheep is healthy. It also eliminates situations in which it is worthwhile for the agent to attempt to
beneﬁt from rewards by declaring that healthy sheep are sick.
Reputation of the agent and credibility of the principal are central to the problem. If the principal
can credibly commit to ignoring information revealed by an agent in one period when taking actions in
following periods, then a broader range of cooperative outcomes are available. However, it is not clear that
the principal could commit to ignoring information, that once obtained, could be used to increase proﬁts.
In addition, in the equilibrium identiﬁed, if the principal performs expensive auditing and provides large
rewards to those reporting truthfully, then it is in the interest of the agent to report truthfully. However,
even though the sellers are reporting truthfully, the principal is expending a great deal of resources for testing
when she knows what the outcome of the tests will be. Therefore, the principal must be able to commit
to performing the expensive auditing even when she knows that everyone is reporting truthfully. This may
also be a commitment that is diﬃcult for the principal to make credibly. In further research using a model
similar to that of Khalil (1997) we will examine in greater detail the problem of the principal being unable
to commit to an auditing strategy that is not time consistent.
We have performed the ﬁrst of many modeling steps necessary to answer how, and if the livestock market
could be normalized. Continuing our work, we will attempt to ﬁnd the conditions in which people would not
block a forecasting and monitoring system. We will study if third party participation is not only necessary
to implement technical aspects of the system, but also to ensure credibility in contracts. It may be that a
system for a credible commitment to monitoring, rewards for truthful reporting, and the protection of private
information must be designed into the forecasting an monitoring system during negotiations concerning its
implementation.
We plan to examine a richer model in which an agent type is imperfectly persistent over time. Rather
than having a ﬁxed type, sheep health follows a Markov process in which its future probability distribution
depends on its current state. Such analysis would allow us to examine the impact of climate forecasting
tools that will improve the precision with which the principal develops her beliefs regarding agent type.
Through this additional analysis, we hope to provide insight to the following question: Although forecast
14and monitoring systems are necessary for a desirable class of cooperative equilibria, can this same information
prevent cooperation if its quality is too high?
Other extensions include allowing for possible geographic correlation among agent types. In this model it
may be worthwhile for the principal to make the contracts contingent not just on an individual’s declaration,
but also on his neighbors’ declarations. Such a model would allow for a richer strategic interaction among
the agents in terms of determining the equilibrium strategy. This work could motivate incentives for group
eﬀects, potentially leading to contracts that utilize group eﬀects for improved outcomes.
As a further extension, we will examine the impact of RVF forecasts on the market. An interesting
feature of the problem is that preventative measures, such as immunization are possible but costly. This
extension would include moral hazard elements similar to Mookherjee and Png (1989). Further complications
arise, however, since immunization must take place weeks before sheep are exposed to the disease. Nomadic
pastoralists have very little access to the Internet and communication technologies, so, in some cases only the
buyers may have access to forecast information. If there is diﬀerential access to forecast products, this may
lead to equity and management issues. We will examine if the buyers might communicate this information
through the contract to provide producers in aﬄicted regions with signals about when to immunize. We also
hope to identify and understand the ways in which forecasts might end up being used by buyers against the
sellers when sellers do not have the same level of access as buyers.
In addition to being an academic contribution, results from this work are of policy relevance. African
producer interests are currently engaged in contentious negotiations with Middle Eastern importers in order
to establish a forecast system and prevent boycotts. Through our work, we hope to inform the debate con-
cerning the potential for the success of monitoring and disease forecasting systems and improving the chances
of successful negotiation outcomes by illustrating the potential for Pareto improvements and informing third
parties of additional roles they may need to play.
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